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Abstract. Compiler optimizations are designed to improve run-time
performance while preserving input-output behavior. Correctness in this
sense does not necessarily preserve security: it is known that standard
optimizations may break or weaken security properties that hold of the
source program. This work develops a translation validation method for
secure compilation. Security (hyper-)properties are expressed using au-
tomata operating over a bundle of program traces. A flexible, automaton-
based refinement scheme, generalizing existing refinement methods, guar-
antees that the associated security property is preserved by a program
transformation. In practice, the refinement relations (“security witnesses”)
can be generated during compilation and validated independently with a
refinement checker. This process is illustrated for common optimizations.
Crucially, it is not necessary to verify the compiler implementation itself,
which is infeasible in practice for production compilers.
1 Introduction
Optimizing compilers such as GCC and LLVM are used to improve run-time
performance of software. Programmers expect the optimizing transformations to
preserve program behavior. A number of approaches, ranging from automated
testing (cf. [27,13]) to translation validation (cf. [24,21,30]) to full mathematical
proof (cf. [14]) have been utilized to check this property.
Programmers also implicitly expect that optimizations do not alter the se-
curity properties of the source code (except, possibly, to strengthen them). It is
surprising, then, to realize that even correctly implemented optimizations, such
as the one illustrated in Figure 1, may weaken security guarantees (cf. [12,10]).
int x := read_secret_key();
use(x);
x := 0; // clear secret data
rest_of_program();
int x := read_secret_key();
use(x);
skip; // dead store removed
rest_of_program();
Fig. 1. Dead Store Elimination: Introducing Information Leaks
This common optimization removes stores that have no effect on the pro-
gram’s input-output behavior. Assuming that x is not referenced in rest_of_program,
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the transformation correctly replaces x := 0 in the source program on the left
with skip. The original assignment, however, was carefully placed to clear the
memory holding the secret key. By removing it, the secret key becomes accessi-
ble in the rest of the program and vulnerable to attack. While this leak can be
blocked using compiler directives [28], such fixes are unsatisfactory, as they are
not portable and might not block other vulnerabilities.
The ideal is a mathematical guarantee that security is preserved across com-
piler optimizations. A full mathematical proof establishing this property over
all source programs is technically challenging but feasible for a compact, for-
mally developed compiler such as CompCert [14,3]. It is, however, infeasible
for compilers such as GCC or LLVM with millions of lines of code written in
hard-to-formalize languages such as C and C++.
The alternative method of Translation Validation [24] settles for the less am-
bitious goal of formally checking the result of every run of a compiler. In the
form considered here, a compiler is designed to generate additional information
(called a “certificate” or a “witness”) to simplify this check [25,20]. To establish
correctness preservation, a refinement (i.e., simulation) relation is the natural
choice for a witness. Moreover, such a relation is validated by checking induc-
tiveness over a pair of single-step transitions (in the source and target programs),
a condition that is easily encoded as an SMT query.
For many optimizations, the associated refinement relations are logically sim-
ple3, being formed of equalities between variables at corresponding source and
target program points [25,16,20]. Crucially, neither the compiler nor the witness
generation machinery have to be proved correct: an invalid witness points to
either a flaw in compilation, or a misunderstanding by the compiler writer of the
correctness argument; both outcomes are worth further investigation.
In this work, we investigate translation validation for preservation of security
properties. Two key questions are: What is a useful witness format for security
properties? and How easy is it to generate and check witnesses for validity?
Refinement proof systems are known only for two important security properties,
non-interference [7,8,17] and constant-time execution [3].
In this context, a major contribution of this work is the development of a uni-
form, automaton-based refinement scheme for a large class of security properties.
We use a logic akin to HyperLTL [5] to describe hyperproperties [26,6] (which
are sets of sets of sequences). A security property ϕ is represented by a formula
Q1pi1, . . . , Qkpik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik), where the pii’s represent traces over an observa-
tion alphabet, the Qi’s stand for either existential or universal quantifiers, and
κ is a set of bundles of k program traces, represented by a non-deterministic
Bu¨chi automaton, A, whose language is the complement4 of the set κ.
3 Examples include dead-store elimination, constant propagation, loop unrolling and
peeling, loop-invariant code motion, static single assignment (SSA) conversion.
4 In this, we follow the standard practice in model checking of using automata for the
negation of the desired property, rather than for the property itself.
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A transformation from program S to program T preserves a security property
ϕ if every violation of ϕ by T has a matching violation of ϕ by S. Intuitively,
matching violations have the same inputs and the same cause.
The first refinement scheme that we propose applies to purely universal prop-
erties, i.e., those of the form ∀pi1 . . . ∀pik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik). The witness is a relation
R between the product transition systems A×T k and A×Sk that meets certain
inductiveness conditions. If R can be defined, the transformation preserves ϕ.
The second refinement scheme applies to properties with arbitrary quantifica-
tion (the ∀∃ alternation is needed to express limits on an attacker’s knowledge).
Here, the witness is a pair of relations: one being a refinement relation (as before)
between the product transition systems A×T k and A×Sk; the other component
is an input-preserving bisimulation relation between T and S. We show that if
such a pair of relations can be defined, the transformation from S to T preserves
ϕ in the sense above.
We give examples of program transformations to illustrate the definition of
security witnesses. As is the case for correctness, these witness relations also have
a simple logical form, which can be analyzed by SMT solvers. The information
needed to define these relations is present during compilation, so the relations
may be easily generated by a compiler.
Finally, we show that the refinement proof rules derived by this scheme from
the automata-theoretic formulations of non-interference and constant-time are
closely related to the known proof rules for these properties. Proofs carried out
with the known notions are also valid for the newly derived ones.
The key contribution of this work is in the flexible refinement scheme, which
makes it possible to construct refinement proof rules for a wide range of se-
curity properties, including subtle variations on standard properties such as
non-interference. The synthesized refinement rules may also be used for deduc-
tive proofs of security preservation. The primary inspiration for the automaton-
based refinement notion comes from a beautiful paper by Manna and Pnueli [15]
demonstrating how to synthesize a deductive verification system for a temporal
property from its associated automaton.
2 Example
To illustrate the approach, consider the following source program, S.
L1: int x := read_secret_input();
L2: int y := 42;
L3: int z := y - 41;
L4: x := x * (z - 1);
In this program, x stores the value of a secret input. As will be described in
Section 3.1, this program can be modeled as a transition system. The states of
the system can be considered to be pairs (α, `). The first component α : V → Int
is a partial assignment mapping variables in V = {x, y, z} to values in Int, the
set of values that a variable of type int can contain. The second component
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` ∈ Loc = {L1, L2, L3, L4} is a location in the program, indicating the next
instruction to be executed. In the initial state, α is empty and ` points to location
L1. Transitions of the system update α according to the variable assignment
instructions, and ` according to the control flow of the program.
To specify a notion of security for this program, two elements are necessary:
an attack model describing what an attacker is assumed to be capable of ob-
serving (Section 3.2) and a security property over a set of program executions
(Section 4). Suppose that an attacker can see the state of the memory at the end
of the program, represented by the final value of α, and the security property
expresses that for every two possible executions of the program, the final state of
the memory must be the same, regardless of the secret input, thus guaranteeing
that the secret does not leak. Unlike correctness properties, this is a two-trace
property, which can be written as a formula of the shape ∀pi1, pi2 : κ(pi1, pi2),
where κ(pi1, pi2) expresses that the memory at the end of the program is the
same for traces pi1 and pi2 (cf. Section 4). The negation of κ can then be trans-
lated into an automaton A that detects violations of this property.
It is not hard to see that the program satisfies the security property, since
y and z have constant values and at the end of the program x is 0. However,
it is important to make sure that this property is preserved after the compiler
performs optimizations that modify the source code. This can be done if the
compiler can provide a witness in the form of a refinement relation (Section 5).
Consider, for example, a compiler which performs constant folding, which sim-
plifies expressions that can be inferred to be constant at compile time. The
optimized program T would be:
L1: int x := read_secret_input();
L2: int y := 42;
L3: int z := 1;
L4: x := 0;
By taking the product of the automaton A with two copies of S or T (one for
each trace pii considered by κ), we obtain automata A × S2 and A × T 2 whose
language is the set of pairs of traces in each program that violates the property.
Since this set is empty for S, it should be empty for T as well, a fact which
can be certified by providing a refinement relation R between the state spaces
of A× T 2 and A× S2.
As the transformation considered here is very simple, the refinement relation
is simple as well: it relates configurations (q, t0, t1) and (p, s0, s1) of the two
spaces if the automaton states p, q are identical, corresponding program states
t0, s0 and t1, s1 are also identical (including program location), and the variables
in s0 and s1 have the constant values derived at their location (see Section 6 for
details). The inductiveness of this relation over transitions of A×T 2 and A×S2
can be easily checked by an SMT solver by representing the states symbolically.
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3 Background
We propose an abstract program and attack model defined in terms of labeled
transition systems. We also define Bu¨chi automata over bundles of program
traces, which will be used in the encoding of security properties, and describe
a product operation between programs and automata that will assist in the
verification of program transformations.
Notation Let Σ be an alphabet, i.e., a set of symbols, and let Γ be a subset of
Σ. An infinite sequence u = u(0), u(1), . . ., where u(i) ∈ Σ for all i, is said to
be a “sequence over Σ”. For variables x, y denoting elements of Σ, the notation
x =Γ y (read as “x and y agree on Γ”) denotes the predicate where either x and
y are both not in Γ , or x and y are both in Γ and x = y. For a sequence u over
Σ, the notation u|Γ (read as “u projected to Γ”) denotes the sub-sequence of u
formed by elements in Γ . The operator compress(v) = v|Σ , applied to a sequence
v over Σ ∪ {ε}, removes all ε symbols in v to form a sequence over Σ. For a
bundle of traces w = (w1, . . . , wk) where each trace is an infinite sequence of Σ,
the operator zip(w) defines an infinite sequence over Σk obtained by choosing
successive elements from each trace. In other words, u = zip(w) is defined by
u(i) = (w1(i), . . . , wk(i)), for all i. The operator unzip is its inverse.
3.1 Programs as Transition Systems
A program is represented as a transition system S = (C,Σ, ι,→):
– C is a set of program states, or configurations;
– Σ is a set of observables, partitioned into input, I, and output, O;
– ι ∈ C is the initial configuration;
– (→) ⊆ C × (Σ ∪ {ε})× C is the transition relation.
Transitions labeled by input symbols in I represent instructions in the pro-
gram that read input values, while transitions labeled by output symbols in O
represent instructions that produce observable outputs. Transitions labeled by
ε represent internal transitions where the state of the program changes without
any observable effect.
An execution is an infinite sequence of transitions (c0, w0, c1)(c1, w1, c2) . . . ∈
(→)ω such that c0 = ι and adjacent transitions are connected as shown. (We
may write this as the alternating sequence c0, w0, c1, w1, c2, . . ..) To ensure that
every execution is infinite, we assume that (→) is left-total. To model programs
with finite executions, we assume that the alphabet has a special termination
symbol ⊥, and add a transition (c,⊥, c) for every final state c. We also assume
that there is no infinite execution where the transition labels are always ε from
some point on.
An execution x = (c0, w0, c1)(c1, w1, c2) . . . has an associated trace, denoted
trace(x), given by the sequence w0, w1, . . . over Σ ∪ {ε}. The compressed trace
of execution x, compress(trace(x)), is denoted ctrace(x). The final assumption
above ensures that the compressed trace of an infinite execution is also infinite.
The sequence of states on an execution x is denoted by states(x).
5
3.2 Attack Models as Extended Transition Systems
The choice of how to model a program as a transition system depends on the
properties one would like to verify. For correctness, it is enough to use the stan-
dard input-output semantics of the program. To represent security properties,
however, it is usually necessary to extend this base semantics to bring out inter-
esting features. Such an extension typically adds auxiliary state and new obser-
vations needed to model an attack. For example, if an attack is based on program
location, that is added as an auxiliary state component in the extended program
semantics. Other examples of such structures are modeling a program stack as
an array with a stack pointer, explicitly tracking the addresses of memory reads
and writes, and distinguishing between cache and main memory accesses. These
extended semantics are roughly analogous to the leakage models of [3]. The base
transition system is extended to one with a new state space, denoted Ce; new
observations, denoted Oe; and a new alphabet, Σe, which is the union of Σ with
Oe. The extensions do not alter input-output behavior; formally, the original
and extended systems are bisimular with respect to Σ.
3.3 Bu¨chi Automata over trace bundles
A Bu¨chi automaton over a bundle of k infinite traces over Σe is specified as
A = (Q,Σke , ι,∆, F ), where:
– Q is the state space of the automaton;
– Σke is the alphabet of the automaton, each element is a k-vector over Σe;
– ι ∈ Q is the initial state;
– ∆ ⊆ Q×Σke ×Q is the transition relation;
– F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
A run of A over a bundle of traces t = (t1, . . . , tk) ∈ (Σω)k is an alternating
sequence of states and symbols, of the form (q0 = ι), a0, q1, a1, q2, . . . where for
each i, ai = (t1(i), . . . , tk(i)) — that is, a0, a1, . . . equals zip(t) — and (qi, ai, qi+1)
is in the transition relation∆. The run is accepting if a state in F occurs infinitely
often along it. The language accepted by A, denoted by L(A), is the set of all
k-trace bundles that are accepted by A.
Automaton-Program Product In verification, the set of traces of a program
that violate a property can be represented by an automaton that is the product
of the program with an automaton for the negation of that property. Security
properties may require analyzing multiple traces of a program; therefore, we
define the analogous automaton as a product between an automaton A for the
negation of the security property and the k-fold composition P k of a program
P . For simplicity, assume for now that the program P contains no ε-transitions.
Programs with ε-transitions can be handled by converting A over Σke into a new
automaton Aˆ over (Σe ∪ {ε})k (see Appendix for details).
Let A = (QA, Σke , ∆
A, ιA, FA) be a Bu¨chi automaton (over a k-trace bundle)
and P = (C,Σe, ι,→) be a program. The product of A and P k, written A×P k,
is a Bu¨chi automaton B = (QB , Σke , ∆
B , ιB , FB), where:
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– QB = QA × Ck;
– ιB = (ιA, (ι, . . . , ι));
– ((q, s), u, (q′, s′)) is in ∆B if, and only if, (q, u, q′) is in ∆A, and (si, ui, s′i) is
in (→) for all i;
– (q, s) is in FB iff q is in FA.
Lemma 1. Trace zip(t1, . . . , tk) is in L(A × P k) if, and only if, zip(t1, . . . , tk)
is in L(A) and, for all i, ti = trace(xi) for some execution xi of P .
Bisimulations For programs S = (CS , Σe, ι
S ,→S) and T = (CT , Σe, ιT ,→T ),
and a subset I of Σe, a relation B ⊆ CT × CS is a bisimulation for I if:
1. (ιT , ιS) ∈ B;
2. For every (t, s) in B and (t, v, t′) in (→T ) there is u and s′ such that (s, u, s′)
is in (→S) and (t′, s′) ∈ B and u =I v.
3. For every (t, s) in B and (s, u, s′) in (→S) there is v and t′ such that (t, v, t′)
is in (→T ) and (t′, s′) ∈ B and u =I v.
4 Formulating Security Preservation
A temporal correctness property ϕ is expressed as a set of infinite traces. Many
security properties can only be described as properties of pairs or tuples of
traces. A standard example is that of noninterference, which models potential
leakage of secret inputs: if two program traces differ only in secret inputs, they
should be indistinguishable to an observer that can only view non-secret inputs
and outputs. The general notion is that of a hyperproperty [26,6], which is a set
containing sets of infinite traces; a program satisfies a hyperproperty H if the
set of all compressed traces of the program is an element of H. Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) is commonly used to express correctness properties. Our formulation
of security properties is an extension of the logic HyperLTL, which can express
common security properties including several variants of noninterference [5].
A security property ϕ has the form (Q1pi1, . . . , Qnpik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik)), where
the Qi’s are first-order quantifiers over trace variables, and κ is set of k-trace
bundles, described by a Bu¨chi automaton whose language is the complement
of κ. This formulation borrows the crucial notion of trace quantification from
HyperLTL, while generalizing it, as automata are more expressive than LTL,
and atomic propositions may hold of k-vectors rather than on a single trace.
The satisfaction of property ϕ by a program P is defined in terms of the fol-
lowing finite two-player game, denoted G(P,ϕ). The protagonist, Alice, chooses
an execution of P for each existential quantifier position, while the antagonist,
Bob, chooses an execution of P at each universal quantifier position. The choices
are made in sequence, from the outermost to the innermost quantifier. A play
of this game is a maximal sequence of choices. The outcome of a play is thus
a “bundle” of program executions, say σ = (σ1, . . . , σk). This induces a corre-
sponding bundle of compressed traces, t = (t1, . . . , tk), where ti = ctrace(σi) for
each i. This play is a win for Alice if t satisfies κ and a win for Bob otherwise.
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A strategy for Bob is a function, say ξ, that defines a non-empty set of
executions for positions i where Qi is a universal quantifier, in terms of the
earlier choices σ1, . . . , σi−1; the choice of σi is from this set. A strategy for
Alice is defined symmetrically. A strategy is winning for player X if every play
following the strategy is a win for X. This game is determined, in that for any
program P one of the players has a winning strategy. Satisfaction of a security
property is defined by the following.
Definition 1. Program P satisfies a security property ϕ, written |=P ϕ, if the
protagonist has a winning strategy in the game G(P,ϕ).
4.1 Secure Program Transformation
Let S = (CS , Σe, ι
S ,→S) be the transition system representing the original
source program and let T = (CT , Σe, ι
T ,→T ) be the transition system for the
transformed target program. Any notion of secure transformation must imply
the preservation property that if S satisfies ϕ and the transformation from S to
T is secure for ϕ then T also satisfies ϕ. This property in itself is, however, too
weak to serve as a definition of secure transformation.
Consider the transformation shown in Figure 1, with use(x) defined so that
it terminates execution if the secret key x is invalid. As the source program
violates non-interference by leaking the validity of the key, the transformation
would be trivially secure if the preservation property is taken as the definition
of secure transformation. But that conclusion is wrong: the leak introduced in
the target program is clearly different and of a more serious nature, as the entire
secret key is now vulnerable to attack.
This analysis prompts the formulation of a stronger principle for secure trans-
formation. (Similar principles have been discussed in the literature, e.g., [11].)
The intuition is that every instance and type of violation in T should have a
matching instance and type of violation in S. To represent different types of
violations, we suppose that the negated property is represented by a collection
of automata, each checking for a specific type of violation.
Definition 2. A strategy ξS for the antagonist in G(S, ϕ) (representing a viola-
tion in S) matches a strategy ξT for the antagonist in game G(T, ϕ) (representing
a violation in T ) if for every maximal play u = u1, . . . , uk following ξ
T , there
is a maximal play v = v1, . . . , vk following ξ
S such that (1) the two plays are
input-equivalent, i.e., ui|I = vi|I for all i, and (2) if u is accepted by the m-th
automaton for the negated property, then v is accepted by the same automaton.
Definition 3. A transformation from S to T preserves security property ϕ if
for every winning strategy for the antagonist in the game G(T, ϕ), there is a
matching winning strategy for the antagonist in the game G(S, ϕ).
As an immediate consequence, we have the preservation property.
Theorem 1. If a transformation from S to T preserves security property ϕ and
if S satisfies ϕ, then T satisfies ϕ.
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In the important case where the security property is purely universal, of the
form ∀pi1, . . . ,∀pik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik), a winning strategy for the antagonist is simply
a bundle of k traces, representing an assignment to pi1, . . . , pik that falsifies κ.
5 Refinement for Preservation of Universal Properties
We define an automaton-based refinement scheme that is sound for purely-
universal properties ϕ, of the form (∀pi1, . . . ,∀pik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik)). Section 8
generalizes this to properties with arbitrary quantifier prefixes. We assume for
simplicity that programs S and T have no ε-transitions; we discuss how to re-
move this assumption at the end of the section. An automaton-based refinement
scheme for preservation of ϕ is defined below.
Definition 4. Let S, T be programs over the same alphabet, Σe, and A be a
Bu¨chi automaton over Σke . Let I be a subset of Σe. A relation R ⊆ (QA ×
(CT )k)× (QA × (CS)k) is a refinement relation from A× T k to A× Sk for I if
1. Initial configurations are related, i.e., ((ιA, ιT
k
), (ιA, ιS
k
)) is in R, and
2. Related states have matching transitions. That is, if ((q, t), (p, s)) ∈ R and
((q, t), v, (q′, t′)) ∈∆A×Tk , there are u, p′, and s′ such that the following hold:
(a) ((p, s), u, (p′, s′)) is a transition in ∆A×S
k
;
(b) u and v agree on I, that is, ui =I vi for all i;
(c) the successor configurations are related, i.e., ((q′, t′), (p′, s′)) ∈ R; and
(d) acceptance is preserved, i.e., if q′ ∈ F then p′ ∈ F .
Lemma 2. If there exists a refinement from A× T k to A× Sk then, for every
sequence v in L(A× T k), there is a sequence u in L(A× Sk) such that u and v
are input-equivalent.
Theorem 2 (Universal Refinement). Let ϕ = (∀pi1, . . . , pik : κ(pi1, . . . , pik))
be a universal security property; S and T be programs over a common alphabet
Σe = Σ ∪ Oe; A = (Q,Σke , ι,∆, F ) be an automaton for the negation of κ; and
R ⊆ (Q× (CT )k)× (Q× (CS)k) be a refinement relation from A×T k to A×Sk
for I. Then, the transformation from S to T preserves ϕ.
Proof. A violation of ϕ by T is given by a bundle of executions of T that violates
κ. We show that there is an input-equivalent bundle of executions of S that also
violates κ. Let x = (x1, . . . , xk) be a bundle of executions of T that does not
satisfy κ. By Lemma 1, v = zip(trace(x1), . . . , trace(xk)) is accepted by A× T k.
By Lemma 2, there is a sequence u accepted by A× Sk that is input-equivalent
to v. Again by Lemma 1, there is a bundle of executions y = (y1, . . . , yk) of S
such that u = zip(trace(y1), . . . , trace(yk)) and y violates κ. As u and v are input
equivalent, trace(xi) and trace(yi) are input-equivalent for all i, as required. uunionsq
The refinement proof rule for universal properties is implicit: a witness is
a relation R from A × T k to A × Sk; this is valid if it satisfies the conditions
set out in Definition 4. The theorem establishes the soundness of this proof
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rule. Examples of witnesses for specific compiler transformations are given in
Section 6, which also discusses SMT-based checking of the proof requirements.
To handle programs that include ε-transitions, we can convert the automaton
A over Σke into a buffering automaton Aˆ over (Σe ∪ {ε})k, such that Aˆ accepts
zip(v1, . . . , vk) iff A accepts zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)). The refinement
is then defined over Aˆ× Sk and Aˆ× T k. Details can be found in the Appendix.
Another useful extension is the addition of stuttering, which can be necessary
for example when a transformation removes instructions. Stuttering relaxes Def-
inition 4 to allow multiple transitions on the source to match a single transition
on the target, or vice-versa. This is a standard technique for verification [4] and
one-step formulations suitable for SMT solvers are known (cf. [18,14]).
6 Checking Transformation Security
This section first describes how to construct the SMT formula that checks the
correctness of a given refinement relation. Next, it demonstrates through concrete
examples how to express a refinement relation for specific program transforma-
tions.
6.1 Refinement Check
Assume that the refinement relation R, the transition relations ∆, (→T ) and
(→S) and the set of accepting states F are described by SMT formulas over
variables ranging over states and alphabet symbols.
To verify that the formula R is indeed a refinement, we perform an inductive
check following the definition of refinement given in Definition 4. To prove the
base case, which says that the initial states of A×T k and A×Sk are related by
R, we simply evaluate the formula on the initial states.
Proving the inductive step again follows from Definition 4, which states that
the transition relations of the automata must preserve membership in R. The
correctness of the inductive step would be expressed by an SMT query of the
shape (∀qT , qS , pT , t, s, t′, σT : (∃σS , pS , s′ : ϕ1 → ϕ2)), where:
ϕ1 ≡R((qT , t), (qS , s)) ∧∆(qT , σT , pT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
(ti
σTi−−→T t′i)
ϕ2 ≡∆(qS , σS , pS) ∧
k∧
i=1
(si
σSi−−→S s′i) ∧
k∧
i=1
(σTi =I σ
S
i )
∧R((pT , t′), (pS , s′)) ∧ (F (pT )→ F (pS))
Note that this formula has a quantifier alternation, which is hard for SMT
solvers to handle. However, the formula can be reduced to a validity check by
providing Skolem functions from the universal to the existential variables. We
expect the compiler to provide these functions. As we will see in the examples
below, in many cases the compiler can choose simple-enough Skolem functions
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that the validity of the formula can be verified using only equality reasoning,
making it unnecessary to even expand ∆ and F to their definitions. More gen-
erally, a compiler writer must have a proof in mind for each optimization and
should therefore be able to provide the necessary Skolem functions to match the
refinement relation.
6.2 Refinement Relations for Compiler Optimizations
We consider three common optimizations below. In addition, further exam-
ples for dead-branch elimination, expression flattening, loop peeling and register
spilling can be found in the Appendix. All transformations were based on the
examples in [3].
Example 1: Constant Folding Section 2 presented an example of a program
transformation by constant folding. We now proceed to show how a refinement
relation can be defined to serve as a witness for the security of this transforma-
tion, so its validity can be checked using an SMT solver as described above.
Recall that states of S and T are of the form (α, `), where α : V → Int and
` ∈ Loc. Then, R can be expressed by the following formula over states qT , qS
of the automaton A and states t of T k and s of Sk, where ti = (α
T
i , `
T
i ):
(qT = qS) ∧ (t = s) ∧
k∧
i=1
(`Ti = L3→ αTi (y) = 42)
∧
k∧
i=1
(`Ti = L4→ αTi (z) = 1) ∧
k∧
i=1
(`Ti = L5→ αTi (x) = 0)
Since this is a simple transformation, equality between states is all that is
needed to establish a refinement. However, to allow the refinement to be verified
automatically, the relation also has to carry information about the constant
values at specific points in the program. In general, if the transformation relies
on the fact that at location ` variable v has constant value c, the constraint∧k
i=1(`
T
i = `→ αTi (v) = c) is added to R.
R can be checked using the SMT query described in Section 6.1. Note that for
this particular transformation the compiler can choose Skolem functions that as-
sign σS = σT and pS = pT . In this case, from (qT = qS) (given by the refinement
relation) and ∆(qT , σT , pT ) the solver can automatically infer ∆(qS , σS , pS),
(σTi =I σ
S
i ) and F (p
T ) → F (pS) using only equality reasoning. Therefore, the
refinement check is independent of the security property in this case. This applies
to many other transformations that occur in practice as well, since their reasons
for preserving security are usually simple.
Example 2: Common-Branch Factorization Common-branch factorization
is a program optimization applied to conditional blocks where the instructions
at the beginning of the then and else blocks are the same. If the condition does
11
not depend on a variable modified by the common instruction, this instruction
can be moved outside of the conditional. Consider for example:
// Source program S
L1: if (j < arr_size) {
L2: a := arr[0];
L3: b := arr[j];
L4: } else {
L5: a := arr[0];
L6: b := arr[arr_size - 1];
L7: }
// Target program T
L1: a := arr[0];
L2: if (j < arr_size) {
L3: b := arr[j];
L4: } else {
L5:
L6: b := arr[arr_size - 1];
L7: }
Suppose that the attack model allows the attacker to observe memory ac-
cesses, represented by the index j of every array access arr[j]. We assume that
other variables are stored in registers rather than memory (see Appendix for a
discussion on register spilling). Under this attack model the compressed traces
produced by T are identical to the ones of S, therefore the transformation will
be secure regardless of the security property ϕ. However, because the order of
instructions is different, a more complex refinement relation R will be needed,
compared to constant folding:
((t = s) ∧ (qT = qS))∨
k∧
i=1
((`Ti = L2)
∧ ((αSi (i) < αSi (arr size)) ? (`Si = L2) : (`Si = L5))
∧ (αTi = αSi [a := arr[0]])) ∧∆(qS , (0, . . . , 0), qT )
The refinement relation above expresses that the states of the programs and
the automata are identical except when T has executed the factored-out in-
struction but S hasn’t yet. At that point, T is at location L2 and S is either at
location L2 or L5, depending on how the guard was evaluated. Note that it is
necessary for R to know that the location of S depends on the evaluation of the
guard, so that it can verify that at the next step T will follow the same branch.
The states of Aˆ×Sk and Aˆ× T k are then related by saying that after updating
a := arr[0] on every track of S the two states will be the same. Note that since
this instruction produces an observation representing the index of the array ac-
cess, the states of the automata are related by ∆(qS , (0, . . . , 0), qT ), indicating
that the access has been observed by Aˆ× T k but not yet by Aˆ× Sk.
Example 3: Switching Instructions This optimization switches two sequen-
tial instructions if the compiler can guarantee that the program’s behavior will
not change. For example, consider the following source and target programs:
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// Source program S
L1: int a[10], b[10];
L2: a[0] := secret_input();
L3: b[0] := secret_input();
L4: for(int j:=1; j<10; j++){
L5: a[j] := b[j-1];
L6: b[j] := a[j-1];
L7: public_output(j);
L8: }
// Target program T
L1: int a[10], b[10];
L2: a[0] := secret_input();
L3: b[0] := secret_input();
L4: for(int j:=1; j<10; j++){
L5: b[j] := a[j-1];
L6: a[j] := b[j-1];
L7: public_output(j);
L8: }
Note that the traces produced by T and S are identical. Therefore, a refine-
ment relation for this pair of programs can be given by the following formula,
regardless of the security property under verification:
(qS = qT )∧
k∧
i=1
(`Si = `
T
i ) ∧ (`Si 6= L6→ αSi = αTi )
∧ (`Si = L6→ αSi [b[j] := a[j-1]] = αTi [a[j] := b[j-1]])
The formula expresses that the state of the source and target programs is the
same except between executing the two switched instructions. At that point, the
state of the two programs is related by saying that after executing the second
instruction in each of the programs they will again have the same state.
More generally, a similar refinement relation can be used for any source-target
pair that satisfies the assumptions that (a) neither of the switched instructions
produces an observable output, and (b) after both switched instructions are
executed, the state of the two programs is always the same. All that is neces-
sary in this case is to replace L6 by the appropriate location `Sswitch where the
switch happens and αSi [b[j] := a[j-1]] = α
T
i [a[j] := b[j-1]] by an appropri-
ate formula δ(αSi , α
T
i ) describing the relationship between the states of the two
programs at that location.
If the instructions being switched do produce observations, setting up the
refinement relation becomes harder. This is due to the fact that the relationship
(qS = qT ) might not hold in location `Sswitch, but expressing the true relationship
between qS and qT is complex and might require knowledge of the state of all
copies of S and T at once. It becomes simpler for some special cases, for example
if the different copies of S and T are guaranteed to be synchronized (i.e., it is
always the case that `Si = `
S
j and `
T
i = `
T
j , for all i and j), or if only one of the
instructions produces an observation. Details can be found in the Appendix.
7 Connections to Existing Proof Rules
We establish connections to known proof rules for preservation of the non-
interference [7,8,17] and constant-time [3] properties. We show that under the
assumptions of those rules, there is a simple and direct definition of a relation
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that meets the automaton-based refinement conditions for automata represent-
ing these properties. The automaton-based refinement method is thus general
enough to serve as a uniform replacement for the specific proof methods.
7.1 Constant Time
We first consider the lockstep CT-simulation proof rule introduced in [3] to show
preservation of the constant-time property. For lack of space, we refer the reader
to the original paper for the precise definitions of observational non-interference
(Definition 1), constant-time as observational non-interference (Definition 4),
lockstep simulation (Definition 5, denoted ≈), and lockstep CT-simulation (Def-
inition 6, denoted (≡S ,≡C)).
We do make two minor adjustments to better fit the automaton notion,
which is based on trace rather than state properties. First, we add a dummy
initial source state Sˆ(i) with a transition with input label i to the actual initial
state S(i); and similarly for the target program, C. Secondly, we assume that a
final state has a self-loop with a special transition label, ⊥. Then the condition
(b ∈ Sf ↔ b′ ∈ Sf ) from Definition 1 in [3] is covered by the (existing) label
equality t = t′. With these changes, the observational non-interference property
can be represented in negated form by the automaton shown in Figure 2, which
simply looks for a sequence starting with an initial pair of input values satisfying
φ and ending in unequal transition labels. The states are I (initial), S (sink), M
(mid), and F (fail), which is also the accepting state.
I M FS
φ(i1, i2)¬φ(i1, i2)
true truet1 = t2
t1 6= t2
Fig. 2. A Bu¨chi automaton for the negation of the constant-time property.
We now define the automaton-based relation, using the notation in Theorem
1 of [3]. Define relation R by (q, α, α′)R(p, a, a′) if a ≈ α, a′ ≈ α′, and
1. p = F , i.e., p is the fail state, or
2. p = q = S, or
3. p = q = I, and α = Cˆ(i), α′ = Cˆ(i′), a = Sˆ(i), a = Sˆ(i′), for some i, i′, or
4. p = q = M , and α ≡C α′, and a ≡S a′.
Theorem 3. If (≡S ,≡C) is a lockstep CT-simulation with respect to the lockstep
simulation ≈, the relation R is a valid refinement relation.
Proof. Every initial state ofA×C2 has a related initial state inA×S2. As related
configurations are pairwise connected by ≈, which is a simulation, it follows
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that any pairwise transition from a C-configuration is matched by a pairwise
transition from the related S-configuration, producing states b, b′ and β, β′ that
are pointwise related by ≈. These transitions have identical input labels, as the
only transitions with input labels are those from the dummy initial states.
The remaining question is whether the successor configurations are connected
by R. We reason by cases.
First, if p = F , then p′ is also F . Hence, the successor configurations are
related. This is also true of the second condition, where p = q = S, as the
successor states are p′ = q′ = S.
If p = q = I the successor states are β = C(i), β′ = C(i′) and b = S(i), b′ =
S(i′), and the successor automaton state is either p′ = q′ = S, if φ(i, i′) does
not hold, or p′ = q′ = M , if it does. In the first possibility, the successor con-
figurations are related by the second condition; in the second, they are related
by the final condition, as C(i) ≡C C(i′) and S(i) ≡S S(i′) hold if φ(i, i′) does
[Definition 6 of [3]].
Finally, consider the interesting case where p = q = M . Let τ, τ ′ be the
transition labels on the pairwise transition in C, and let t, t′ be the labels on the
corresponding pairwise transition in S. We consider two cases:
(1) Suppose t 6= t′. Then p′ = F and the successor configurations are related,
regardless of p′.
(2) Otherwise, t = t′ and p′ = M . By CT-simulation [Definition 6 of of [3]:
a ≡S a′ and α ≡C α′ by the relation R], it follows that b ≡S b′ and β ≡C β′
hold, and τ = τ ′. Thus, the successor automaton state on the C-side is q′ = M
and the successor configurations are related by the final condition.
This completes the case analysis. Finally, the definition of R implies that if
q = F then p = F , as required.
uunionsq
7.2 Non-Interference
Refinement-based proof rules for preservation of non-interference have been in-
troduced in [7,8,17]. The rules are not identical but are substantially similar in
nature, providing conditions under which an ordinary simulation relation, ≺,
between programs C and S implies preservation of non-interference. We choose
the rule from [8], which requires, in addition to the requirement that ≺ is a sim-
ulation preserving input and output events, that (a) A final state of C is related
by ≺ only to a final state of S (precisely, both are final or both non-final), and
(b) If t0 ≺ s0 and t1 ≺ s1 hold, and all states are either initial or final, then the
low variables of t0 and t1 are equal iff the low variables of s0 and s1 are equal.
We make two minor adjustments to better fit the automaton notion, which
is based on trace rather than state properties. First, we add a dummy initial
source state Sˆ(i) with a transition that exposes the value of local variables and
moves to the actual initial state S(i) (i is the secret input); and similarly for the
target program, C. Secondly, we assume that a final state has a self-loop with a
special transition label that exposes the value of local variables on termination.
With these changes, the negated non-interference can be represented by the
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automaton shown in Figure 3. It accepts an pair of execution traces if, and
only if, initially the low-variables on the two traces have identical values, and
either the corresponding outputs differ at some point, or final values of the
low-variables are different. (The transition conditions are written as Boolean
predicates which is a readable notation for describing a set of pairs of events;
e.g., the Low1 6= Low2 transition from state I represents the set of pairs (a, b)
where a is the init(Low = i) event, b is the init(Low = j) event, and i 6= j.)
IS M F
true true true
Low1 = Low2Low1 6= Low2
Final1 ∧ Final2
∧Low1 6= Low2
Out1 6= Out2
Fig. 3. A Bu¨chi automaton for the negation of the non-interference property.
Define the automaton-based relation R by (q, t0, t1)R(p, s0, s1) if p = q and
t0 ≺ s0 and t1 ≺ s1. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If the simulation relation ≺ between C and S satisfies the addi-
tional properties needed to preserve non-interference, then R is a refinement.
Proof. Consider (q, t0, t1)R(p, s0, s1). As ≺ is a simulation, for any joint tran-
sition from (t0, t1) to (t
′
0, t
′
1), there is a joint transition from (s0, s1) to (s
′
0, s
′
1)
such that t′0 ≺ s′0 and t′1 ≺ s′1 holds. This transition preserves input and output
values, as ≺ is an input-output preserving simulation.
We have only to establish that the automaton transitions also match up. If
the automaton state is either F or S, the resulting state is the same, so by the
refinement relation, we have p′ = p = q = q′.
Consider q = I. If q′ = S then the values of the low variables in t0, t1 differ;
in which case, by condition (b), those values differ in s0, s1 as well, so p
′ is also
S. Similarly, if q′ = M , then p′ = M .
Consider q = M . If q′ = F then either (1) t0, t1 are both final states and the
values of the low variables differ; in which case, by condition (b), those values
differ in s0, s1 as well, so p
′ is also F , or (2) the outputs of the transitions from
t0, t1 to t
′
0, t
′
1 differ; in which case, as ≺ preserves outputs, this is true also of
the transition from s0, s1 to s
′
0, s
′
1, so p
′ is also F . If q′ = M then the outputs
are identical and one of t0, t1 is non-final; in which case, by condition (a), that
is true also for the pair s0, s1, so p
′ is also M .
Finally, by the relation R, if q = F , the accepting state, then p = F as well.
This completes the case analysis and the proof. uunionsq
8 Witnessing General Security Properties
The notion of refinement presented in Section 5 suffices for universal hyperprop-
erties, as in that case a violation corresponds to a bundle of traces rejected by the
16
automaton. Although many important hyperproperties are universal in nature,
there are cases that require quantifier alternation. One example is generalized
noninterference, as formalized in [5], which says that for every two traces of a
program, there is a third trace that has the same high inputs as the first but is
indistinguishable from the second to a low-clearance individual. A violation for
such hyperproperties, as defined in Section 4, is not simply a bundle of traces,
but rather a winning strategy for the antagonist in the corresponding game. A
refinement relation does not suffice to match winning strategies. Therefore, we
also introduce an input-equivalent bisimulation B from T to S, which is used
in a back-and-forth manner to construct a matching winning strategy for the
antagonist in G(S, ϕ) from any winning strategy for the antagonist in G(T, ϕ).
A bisimulation B ensures, by induction, that any infinite execution in T has
an input-equivalent execution in S, and vice-versa. For an execution x of T , we
use B(x) to denote the set of input-equivalent executions in S induced by B,
which is non-empty. The symmetric notion, B−1(y), refers to input-equivalent
executions in T induced by B for an execution y of S.
Definition 5. Let ξT be a strategy for the antagonist in G(T, ϕ) and B be a
bisimulation between T and S. Then, the strategy ξS = S(ξT , B) for the antag-
onist in G(S, ϕ) proceeds in the following way to produce a play (y1, . . . , yk):
– For every i such that pii is existentially quantified, let yi be chosen by the pro-
tagonist in G(S, ϕ). Choose an input-equivalent execution xi from B−1(yi);
– For every i such that pii is universally quantified, choose xi in ξ
T (x1, . . . , xi−1)
and choose yi from B(xi).
Thus, the bisimulation helps define a strategy ξS to match a winning an-
tagonist stategy ξT in T . We can establish that this stategy is winning for the
antagonist in S in two different ways. First, we do so under the assumption that
S and T are input-deterministic, i.e., any two executions of the program with the
same input sequence have the same observation sequence. This is a reasonable
assumption, covering sequential programs with purely deterministic actions.
Theorem 5. Let S and T be input-deterministic programs over the same input
alphabet I. Let ϕ be a general security property with automaton A representing
the negation of its kernel κ. If there exists (1) a bisimulation B from T to S,
and (2) a refinement relation R from A × T k to A × Sk for I, then T securely
refines S for ϕ.
Proof. We have to show, from Definition 3, that for any winning strategy ξT for
the antagonist in G(T, ϕ), there is a matching winning stategy ξS in G(S, ϕ). Let
ξS = S(ξT , B). Let y = (y1, . . . , yk) be the bundle of executions resulting from
a play following the strategy ξS , and x = (x1, . . . , xk) the corresponding bundle
resulting from ξT . By construction, y and x are input-equivalent.
Since ξT is a winning strategy, the trace of x is accepted by A×T k. Then, from
the refinement R and Lemma 2, there is a bundle z = (z1, . . . , zk) accepted by
A×Sk that is input-equivalent to x. Therefore, z is a win for the antagonist. Since
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z is input-equivalent to x, it is also input-equivalent to y. Input-determinism
requires that z and y are identical, so y is also a win for the antagonist. Thus,
ξS is a winning strategy for the antagonist in G(S, ϕ). uunionsq
If S and T are not input-deterministic, a new notion of refinement is defined
that intertwines the automaton-based relation, R, with the bisimulation, B. A
relation R ⊆ (QA× (CT )k)× (QA× (CS)k) is a refinement relation from A×T k
to A× Sk for I relative to B ⊆ CT × CS , if
1. ((ιA, ιT
k
), (ιA, ιS
k
)) is in R and (ιT
k
i , ι
Sk
i ) ∈ B for all i; and
2. If ((q, t), (p, s)) is in R, (ti, si) is in B for all i, ((q, t), v, (q
′, t′)) is in ∆A×T
k
,
(s, u, s′) is in (→Sk), u and v agree on I, and (t′i, s′i) ∈ B, there is p′ such
that all of the following hold:
(a) ((p, s), u, (p′, s′)) ∈ ∆A×Sk ;
(b) ((q′, t′), (p′, s′)) ∈ R;
(c) if q′ ∈ F then p′ ∈ F .
Typically, a refinement relation implies, as in Lemma 2, that a run in A×T k
is matched by some run in A×Sk. The unusual refinement notion above instead
considers already matching executions of T and S, and formulates an inductive
condition under which a run of A on the T -execution is matched by a run on the
S-execution. The result is the following theorem, establishing the new refinement
rule, where the witness is the pair (R,B).
Theorem 6. Let S and T be programs over the same input alphabet I. Let ϕ be
a general security property with automaton A representing its kernel κ. If there
exists (1) a bisimulation B from T to S, and (2) a relation R from A × T k to
A× Sk that is a refinement relative to B, then T securely refines S for ϕ.
8.1 Checking General Refinement Relations
The main difference when checking security preservation of general hyperprop-
erties, compared to the purely-universal properties handled in Section 5, is the
necessity of the compiler to provide also the bisimulation B as part of the wit-
ness. The verifier must then check also that B is a bisimulation, which can be
performed inductively using SMT queries in a similar way to the refinement it-
self. In the case that the language semantics guarantee input-determinism, as
described above, then Theorem 5 holds and checking B and R separately is suf-
ficient. Otherwise, the check for R described in Section 6.1 has to be modified
to follow Theorem 6 by checking if R is a refinement relative to B.
Note that appropriate formulas B(t, s) describing bisimulations can be ex-
tracted from the examples of refinement relations given in Section 6:
1. Constant Folding: (t = s) ∧ (`T = L3 → αT (y) = 42) ∧ (`T = L4 →
αT (z) = 1) ∧ (`T = L5→ αT (x) = 0)
2. Common-Branch Factorization: (t = s) ∨ ((`T = L2) ∧ ((αS(i) <
αS(arr size)) ? (`S = L2) : (`S = L5)) ∧ (αT = αS [a := arr[0]]))
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3. Switching Instructions: (`S = `T ) ∧ (`S 6= L6→ αS = αT ) ∧ (`S = L6→
αS [b[j] := a[j-1]] = αT [a[j] := b[j-1]])
Note the similarities between the bisimulations above and the refinement
relations from Section 6. When the transformation does not alter the observable
behavior of a program, it is often the case that the refinement relation between
Aˆ × T k and Aˆ × Sk is essentially formed by the k-product of a bisimulation
between T and S across the several tracks.
9 Discussion and Related Work
This work tackles the important problem of ensuring that optimizations carried
out by a compiler do not break vital security properties of the source program.
We propose a methodology based on property-specific refinement rules, with the
refinement relations (witnesses) being generated at compile time and validated
independently by a generic refinement checker. This structure ensures that nei-
ther the code of the compiler nor the witness generator have to be formally
verified in order to obtain a formally verifiable conclusion. It is thus eminently
suited to production compilers, which are large and complex, and are written in
hard-to-formalize languages such as C or C++.
The refinement rules are synthesized from an automaton-theoretic definition
of a security property. This construction applies to a broad range of security
properties, including those specifiable in the HyperLTL logic [5]. When applied to
automaton-based formulations of the non-interference and constant-time prop-
erties, the resulting proof rules are essentially identical to those developed in
the literature in [7,8,17] for non-interference and in [3] for constant-time. Manna
and Pnueli show in a beautiful paper [15] how to derive custom proof rules for
deductive verification of a LTL property from an equivalent Bu¨chi automaton;
our constructions are inspired by this work.
Refinement witnesses are in a form that is composable: i.e., for a security
property ϕ, if R is a refinement relation establishing a secure transformation
from A to B, while R′ witnesses a secure transformation from B to C, then
the relational composition R;R′ witnesses a secure transformation from A to C.
Thus, by composing witnesses for each compiler optimization, one obtains an
end-to-end witness for the entire optimization pipeline.
Other approaches to secure compilation include full abstraction, proposed
in [1] (cf. [22]), and trace-preserving compilation [23]. These are elegant for-
mulations but difficult to check fully automatically, and hence not suitable for
translation validation. The theory of hyperproperties [6] includes a definition of
refinement in terms of language inclusion (i.e., T refines S if the language of T
is a subset of the language of S), which implies that any subset-closed hyper-
property is preserved by refinement in that sense. Language inclusion is also not
directly checkable and thus cannot be used for translation validation. The re-
finement theorem in this paper for universal properties (which are subset-closed)
uses a tighter step-wise inductive check that is suitable for automated validation.
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Translation validation through compiler-generated refinement relations arises
from work on “Credible Compilation” by [25,16] and “Witnessing” by [20]. As
the compiler and the witness generator do not require formal verification, the
size of the trusted code base shrinks substantially. Witnessing also requires much
less effort than a full mathematical proof: as observed in [19], a mathematical
correctness proof of SSA (Static Single Assignment) conversion in Coq is about
10,000 lines [29], while refinement checking can be implemented in around 1,500
lines of code, most of which comprises a witness validator which can be reused
across different transformations. Our work shows how to extend this concept,
originally developed for correctness checking, to the preservation of a large class
of security properties, with the following important distinction. The refinement
relations used for correctness are strong in that (via well-known results) re-
finement preserves all linear-time properties defined over atomic propositions
common to both programs. Strong preservation is needed as the desired cor-
rectness properties may not be fully known or their specifications may not be
available in practice. On the other hand, security properties are limited in na-
ture and are likely to be well known in advance (e.g., “do not leak secret keys”).
This motivates our construction of property-specific refinement relations. Being
more focused, they are also easier to establish than refinements that preserve all
properties in a class.
The refinement rules defined here implicitly require that a security specifica-
tion apply equally well to the target and source programs. Thus, they are most
applicable when the target and source languages and attack models are identical.
This is the case, for instance, in the optimization phase of a compiler, where a
number of transformations are applied to code that remains within the same in-
termediate representation. To complete the picture, it is necessary to look more
generally at transformations that go from a higher-level language (say LLVM
bytecode) to a lower-level one (say x86 machine code). The so-called “attack
surfaces” are different for these two levels, so it would be necessary to also incor-
porate a back-translation of failures [9] in the refinement proof rules. How best
to do so is an intriguing topic for future work.
Another question that we leave to future work is the completeness of the
refinement rules. We have shown that a variety of common compiler transfor-
mations can be proved secure through logically simple refinement relations. The
completeness question is whether every secure transformation has an associated
stepwise refinement relation. In the case of correctness, this is a well-known the-
orem by Abadi and Lamport [2]. To the best of our knowledge, a corresponding
theorem is not known for security hyperproperties.
There are a number of practical concerns that must be addressed to imple-
ment this methodology in a real compiler. One of these is a convenient notation
for specifying desired security properties at the source level, for example as an-
notations to the source program. It is also necessary to define precisely how a
security property is transformed by a program optimization. For instance, if a
transformation introduces fresh variables, there needs to be a reasonable way to
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determine whether those should be assigned a high or low security level for a
non-interference property.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Lemma 2 Let S, T be programs over the same alphabet Σe and A be a Bu¨chi
automaton over Σke . Let I be a subset of Σe, and let R be a refinement relation
from A × T k to A × Sk for I. For every sequence v in L(A × T k), there is a
sequence u in L(A× Sk) such that u and v are input-equivalent.
Proof. Let v = v0, v1 . . . be in L(A×T k). Let ρT = (q0 = ιA, t0 = ιTk), v0, (q1, t1), v1, . . .
be an accepting run on this sequence. By a simple induction from the refinement
conditions, there is a sequence u = u0, u1, . . . and a run ρ
S = (p0 = ι
A, s0 =
ιS
k
), u0, (p1, s1), u1, . . . of A × Sk on u such that for each i, all of the following
hold.
1. ((qi, ti), (pi, si)) ∈ R;
2. ui and vi agree on I;
3. if qi ∈ F then pi ∈ F .
As the run ρT is accepting for A×T k, there are infinitely many points on the
run satisfying F . By the third condition above, F holds infinitely often along ρS
as well, so that run is accepting for A× Sk. By the second condition, ui and vi
agree on I for all i, so u and v are input-equivalent, as required. uunionsq
Theorem 6 Let S and T be programs over the same input alphabet I. Let ϕ be
a general security property with automaton A representing its kernel κ. If there
exists (1) a bisimulation B from T to S, and (2) a relation R from A × T k to
A× Sk that is a refinement relative to B, then T securely refines S for ϕ.
Proof. Let ξT be a winning strategy for the opponent in G(T, ϕ), and ξS =
S(ξT , B). By construction, a play of ξS results in a bundle of k executions of
S, y = (y1, . . . , yk), such that the bundle is pointwise input-equivalent to a
bundle x = (x1, . . . , xk) resulting from a play following ξ
T . Furthermore, by
construction, x and y are pointwise related by B.
As ξT is a winning strategy for the opponent, (trace(x1), . . . , trace(xk)) does
not satisfy κ. Therefore, w = zip(trace(x1), . . . , trace(xk)) has an accepting run
rT onA×T k for which the program components are zip(states(x1), . . . , states(xk)).
By the definition of R, the initial states of A × T k and A × Sk are related
by R, and the program components of these states are related pointwise by
B. These program components are also the initial states of zip(x1, . . . , xk) and
zip(y1, . . . , yk). By construction, the i-th entry on zip(x1, . . . , xk) is related by B
k
to the i-th entry on zip(y1, . . . , yk), for all positions i. By an inductive argument
using the refinement relation, one can construct a corresponding run, rS , of
A × Sk such that the program components are zip(states(x1), . . . , states(xk)).
Moreover, for every final state in rT , its corresponding state in rS is also final.
As rT is accepting, so is rS . Hence, the play y is a win for the opponent.
As this is true for arbitrary choices made by the player in G(S, ϕ), the strategy
ξS is a winning strategy, as required. uunionsq
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A.2 Buffering Automata
The refinement relation described in Definition 4 makes use of a version of
automaton-program product that assumes that every program and automaton
transition has an observable label. Although this can be reasonable depending
on the attack model (for example, when modeling constant-time security [3]), in
many cases the program will include ε-transitions that produce no observation.
This can lead to situations when two output traces become unsynchronized. At
the end of Section 5 we briefly described a way to handle this issue by construct-
ing a buffering automata. We now explain this construction in more detail.
As an example of when buffering automata are needed, consider the program
below, and the property which says that the output trace is identical for any
pair of inputs.
int x := read_input();
for(i := 0; true; i := i+1) {
write_output(i);
for(int t := x; t > 0; t := t-1); // delay for x steps
}
It is evident that this property holds, as every execution produces the out-
put sequence 0, 1, . . .. Yet, successive outputs are separated by |x| steps, thus,
outputs of executions with different input values are not synchronized, and the
gap between corresponding outputs grows without bound.
To match this program behavior to the automaton for the negated trace
property, we require converting the automaton A over Σke into an automaton
Aˆ over (Σe ∪ {ε})k, called a buffering automaton, with the following property:
Aˆ accepts zip(v1, . . . , vk) iff A accepts zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)). This
produces an infinite-state automaton with buffers of unbounded size, that store
observation histories of each trace. As the proof method is based on single-
step refinement, an infinite-state automaton is not necessarily an obstacle to
automated checking, so long as its structure can be represented symbolically in
an SMT-supported theory. Furthermore, in many cases the refinement check can
be performed without needing to reason about the structure of the automaton
at all (see Section 6 for examples).
Formally, given an automaton A = (Q,Σk, ι,∆, F ), we define the buffering
automaton Aˆ = (Q × (Σ∗)k × {0, 1}, (Σ ∪ {ε})k, (ι, ε, . . . , ε, 0), ∆ˆ, F × (Σ∗)k ×
{1}). Note that the state space of Aˆ stores k finite sequences of observations,
representing the prefix of the traces produced so far by each copy of the program.
The alphabet of Aˆ allows the copies to perform ε-transitions, representing the
fact that each track might produce observations at different rates. The transition
relation ∆ˆ is defined in the following way. ((q, w, b), u, (q′, w′, b′)) ∈ ∆ˆ, for q, q′ ∈
Q, w,w′ ∈ (Σ∗)k, u ∈ (Σ ∪ {ε})k and b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}, if:
1. q = q′, wiui = w′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, w′i = ε for some i, and b′ = 0; or
2. there is σ ∈ Σk such that wiu = σiw′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (q, σ, q′) ∈ ∆,
and b′ = 1.
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Intuitively, whenever the k copies of the program perform a transition, pro-
ducing observations u = (u1, . . . , uk), Aˆ concatenates ui with the sequence wi
stored as part of the state. Then, if any of the resulting sequences is empty, the
state q of the automaton does not advance. Otherwise, if all of the sequences
are non-empty, the automaton reads the first position of all sequences, removing
them from the buffer, and transitions to a new state q′ accordingly. In this way,
Aˆ visits the same states that A would visit if all of the tracks were synchronized,
possibly with delays due to having to wait until all tracks have produced the
next observation.
The {0, 1} component of the state is needed to indicate whether the automa-
ton makes progress. It remains as 0 while the automaton is still waiting for an
observation from one of the tracks, and is set to 1 whenever the automaton
takes a transition to a different Q state. Aˆ accepts iff it makes progress into an
accepting Q state infinitely often.
Lemma 3. Aˆ accepts zip(v1, . . . , vk) iff A accepts zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)).
Proof. Given an accepting run rˆ of Aˆ on zip(v1, . . . , vk), a corresponding ac-
cepting run r of A on zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)) can be constructed in
the following way. First, note that there are two kinds of transitions in rˆ, each
corresponding to one of the two cases in the definition of ∆ˆ. Due to our assump-
tion that no program has a trace that after a point only produces ε, transitions
of the second kind must occur infinitely often in rˆ. For every such transition
((q, w, b), u, (q′, w′, b′)) there is a corresponding transition (q, σ, q′) ∈ ∆, and
between two such transitions q does not change. Therefore, the corresponding
transitions in ∆ can be put end-to-end to form a run r on A. By construction of
∆ˆ, the trace of r is precisely zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)). Furthermore,
note that accepting states (q′, w′, 1) of Aˆ can only be reached by transitions of
the second kind, and in every such state q′ is an accepting state of A. Therefore,
every occurrence of an accepting state (q′, w′, 1) in rˆ has a corresponding occur-
rence of q′ in r. Since such occurrences happen infinitely often, r is an accepting
run.
To prove the opposite direction, assume that r is an accepting run of A on
zip(compress(v1), . . . , compress(vk)). Then, a corresponding accepting run rˆ of Aˆ
on zip(v1, . . . , vk) can be constructed in the following way. Note that the only
source of nondeterminism in ∆ˆ is in the choice of (q, σ, q′) ∈ ∆ for the second
kind of transition. If this choice is always made by choosing the next transition
in r, then an accepting state (q′, w′, 1) will be visited infinitely often. Therefore,
rˆ will be accepting. The construction of ∆ˆ guarantees that rˆ constructed in this
way will be a valid run of zip(v1, . . . , vk) in Aˆ. uunionsq
Since the alphabet of Aˆ is (Σ∪{ε})k, we can take its product with the k-fold
composition of a program with ε transitions.
Lemma 4. A bundle of executions σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) produced by program P does
not satisfy κ iff zip(trace(σ1), . . . , trace(σk)) is accepted by Aˆ× P k.
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Proof. Bundle σ does not satisfy κ iff (by definition) zip(ctrace(σ1), . . . , ctrace(σk))
is accepted by A, iff (by Lemma 3) zip(trace(σ1), . . . , trace(σk)) is accepted by
Aˆ, iff (as zip(trace(σ1), . . . , trace(σk)) is the trace of execution zip(σ1, . . . , σk) of
P k and Lemma 1) zip(trace(σ1), . . . , trace(σk)) is accepted by Aˆ× P k. uunionsq
A.3 Additional Examples of Refinement Relations
Example 3: Switching Instructions (Special Cases) As mentioned in Sec-
tion 6, setting up a refinement relation for the switching-instructions transfor-
mation becomes harder if the instructions being switched produce observations,
due to the fact that (qS = qT ) might not hold at the location of the switch.
There are some special cases, however, where this may be done more easily:
1. If the different copies of S and T are guaranteed to be synchronized (i.e., it
is always the case that `Si = `
S
j and `
T
i = `
T
j , for all i and j).
2. If only one of the switched instructions produces an observation.
The advantage of the first case is that if all k copies of the program produce
corresponding observations at the same time, the automaton can compare them
immediately and does not need to store them in its internal state. Then, it
is likely that for many relevant security properties the state of the automaton
does not change at all when executing the switched instructions, and so the
relationship (qS = qT ) still holds. In this case the constraint that `Si = `
S
j and
`Ti = `
T
j , for all i and j, must be added to R. Additionally, R will need to
include enough information for the inductive check to confirm that the state of
the automaton indeed does not change while observing the switched instructions.
What this information is will depend on the property under verification.
The second case can be handled in a couple of different ways. One option, for
example, is to relax the constraint (`Si = `
T
i ) to instead relate the instruction that
produces an observation in the source with the same instruction that produces
an observation in the target (say, L5 in the source with L6 in the target). Then,
stuttering can be used in both the source and the target to align the executions
(for example, the target stutters in L5, and the source stutters in L6). This
will also require changing the constraints (`Si 6= `Sswitch → αSi = αTi ) ∧ (`Si =
`Sswitch → δ(αSi , αTi )) keeping track of the changes in state appropriately. The
modified refinement seeks to align the observations rather than the instructions.
An easier alternative, instead, might be to model S and T in such a way that
the two instructions are considered as a block, comprising a single transition
in the transition systems. Then, since the two blocks modify the state of the
program in the same way and produce the same observation, the refinement
relation becomes trivial.
Example 4: Dead-Branch Elimination This optimization replaces an if
statement whose guard is trivially false by only the contents of the else branch.
For simplicity, assume there is always an else branch (if statements with no
else branch can be modeled by leaving the else branch empty). Consider the
following example programs:
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// Source program S
L1: int x := secret_input();
L2: if (0) {
L3: public_output(x);
L4: } else {
L5: secret_output(x);
L6: }
// Target program T
L1: int x := secret_input();
L2: secret_output(x);
The refinement relation for this source-target pair can be written as:
(qS = qT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
(αSi = α
T
i ) ∧ L(`Si , `Ti )
where L = {(L1, L1), (L2, L2), (L5, L2), (End,End)} denotes which locations
can be related between the source and the target. Note that since L2 in the target
is related to both L2 and L5 in the source, it is necessary to allow stuttering
when checking the refinement relation.
This same refinement relation can be used for arbitrary programs, as long as
L is redefined appropriately. Let `Sif be the program location of the if guard (L2
in the example), and `Selse be the program location at the start of the else branch
(L5 in the example). Let `Telse be the location in the target corresponding to `
S
else
(L2 in the example). L is then defined to be a binary relation relating program
locations between the source and target in the following way: corresponding
locations are related by L, and `Telse, in addition to being related to `
S
else, is also
related to `Sif .
Note that this relation also defines a relation B((αSi , `
S
i ), (α
T
i , `
T
i )) = (α
S
i =
αTi ) ∧ L(`Si , `Ti ) between single program states of S and T such that B is a
(stuttering) bisimulation. Therefore, this refinement relation can also be used
for security properties with arbitrary quantifier alternation.
Example 5: Expression Flattening This optimization “flattens” a nested
expression. It can be thought of as turning an expression into three-address
code. For example:
// Source program S
L1: int x := (f(a) + b) * (g(c) / d);
// Target program T
L1: int t0 := f(a);
L2: int t1 := t0 + b;
L3: int t2 := g(c);
L4: int t3 := t2 / d;
L5: int x := t1 * t3;
Note that many programming languages leave the evaluation order of subex-
pressions undefined. Different orders of evaluation may generate different result
states, e.g., if subexpressions such as f(a), g(c) have side-effects. This trans-
formation picks a certain evaluation order. Thus, while in a detailed program
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semantics the original expression has an undetermined evaluation order, a spe-
cific order is fixed in the target program. This is an example of a transformation
that removes non-determinism from the program.
The original and flattened evaluations are equivalent when the detailed evalu-
ation is treated as a block, ignoring the values of intermediate variables. Thus, the
correctness argument establishes that, starting from states related by αSi (v) =
αTi (v) for all v ∈ {a, b, c, d}, the ordered execution in the target T matches the
result of one of the possible non-deterministic evaluation choices in the source
S, resulting in states that are also identically related, in this case αSi (v) = α
T
i (v)
for all v ∈ {a, b, c, d, x}.
For any automaton, we thus define the relation R as:
(qS = qT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
(αSi =V α
T
i )
where V = {a, b, c, d, x} denotes all non-temporary variables (i.e., excluding vari-
ables introduced by the transformation), and (αSi =V α
T
i ) denotes the pointwise
equality of αSi (v) and α
T
i (v) for all v ∈ V .
It is easy to show that this relation is a refinement relation if the transition
system representing T is modeled in such a way that the transformed segments
are treated as a block of instructions defining a single transition. In this case
the refinement check requires only a single inductive step, following the rea-
soning described above. If instead the instructions in the target are treated as
individual transitions rather than a block, it is necessary to add constraints
to remember the value of the intermediate variables in the target, for example
(`Ti ∈ {L3, L4, L5} → αTi (t1) = αTi (t0) + αTi (b)). With this addition, the rela-
tion can then be used as a stuttering refinement, where the stuttering is bounded
by the length of the expanded block.
Note that the correctness of the refinement relies on the assumption that
there is no change in observations between the original single-instruction block
and the new multiple-instruction block. That may not be the case depending on
the attack model. For instance, if x := (secret + 2) - secret is compiled to
t1 := secret + 2; x := t1 - secret then the secret value is leaked in the
value of t1, even though there is no leakage in the original assignment to x in the
source. Whether this matters depends on the attack model. If the attack model
allows values of temporary variables to be observable, then the transformation
is not secure.
Unlike previous examples, the correspondence for single traces in expres-
sion flattening is not in general a bisimulation, since the elimination of non-
determinism means that there might be a transition in the source with no cor-
responding transition in the target. Therefore, the security preservation result
applies only to universally-quantified properties.
Example 6: Loop Peeling This optimization peels off the first iteration of a
loop, as long as the compiler can guarantee that the loop guard will be true on
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entry. For simplicity, assume only while loops. Consider the following example
programs:
// Source program S
L1: int x := 0;
L2: int k := 0;
L3: while (k < 8) {
L4: if (k == 0) {
L5: x := secret_input();
L6: } else {
L7: x := x + x;
L8: }
L9: k := k + 1;
L10: public_output(x % k);
L11: }
// Target program T
L1: int x := 0;
L2: int k := 0;
L3: if (k == 0) {
L4: x := secret_input();
L5: } else {
L6: x := x + x;
L7: }
L8: k := k + 1;
L9: public_output(x % k);
L10: while (k < 8) {
L11: if (k == 0) {
L12: x := secret_input();
L13: } else {
L14: x := x + x;
L15: }
L16: k := k + 1;
L17: public_output(x % k);
L18: }
Since the two programs produce the same traces, the following refinement
relation can be used independently of the security property:
L = {(L1, L1), (L2, L2), (L3, L3), (L4, L3), (L5, L4), (L7, L6), (L9, L8), (L10, L9),
(L3, L10), (L4, L11), (L5, L12), (L7, L14), (L9, L16), (L10, L17), (End,End)}
(qS = qT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
(αSi = α
T
i ) ∧ L(`Si , `Ti ) ∧ (`Ti = L3→ αSi (k) < 8)
This refinement relation requires stuttering, as the target stutters in L3 while
the source moves from L3 and L4. For general programs, L should be defined as
follows:
1. Corresponding locations are related by L.
2. Every instruction in the peeled loop iteration in the target is related by L
to the corresponding instruction within the loop body in the source.
3. `Tpeel, the location at the start of the peeled loop iteration in the target, is
additionally related by L to `Sguard, the location of the loop guard in the
source. In the example, both `Tpeel and `
S
guard are L3.
The formula ϕ0 = (`
T
i = L3 → αSi (k) < 8) in the example serves to state
that the loop will be entered. It must be added to the refinement relation in
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order to justify the execution of the peeled iteration in the target. For arbitrary
programs, the general form of ϕ0 is (`
T
i = `
T
peel → ψ(αSi )), where ψ is the loop
guard at location `Sguard. In the example, adding just ϕ0 suffices, since it can be
proved inductively from the previous instruction int k := 0. However, in more
complex cases other formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of the same form might need to be added
to describe the compiler’s reasoning leading up to the conclusion that ϕ0 holds.
For example, suppose that int k := 0 was replaced by int k := x. Then it
would be necessary to add a formula such as ϕ1 = (`
T
i = L2 → αSi (x) < 8) in
order for the relation to pass the refinement check. Therefore, the general form
of the refinement relation for an arbitrary program is:
(qS = qT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
(αSi = α
T
i ) ∧ L(`Si , `Ti ) ∧ ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn
For security properties with arbitrary quantifier alternation, the bisimulation
can simply be defined as B((αSi , `
S
i ), (α
T
i , `
T
i )) = (α
S
i = α
T
i ) ∧ L(`Si , `Ti ) ∧ ϕ0 ∧
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn.
Example 7: Register Spilling This transformation “spills” the contents of a
register to memory, if the register has to be free for a subsequent operation. For
example, consider a machine with only two registers, A and B.
// Source program S
L1: int t0 := a + b;
L2: public_output(t0);
L3: int t1 := a - b;
// Target program T
// assume A = a, B = b
L1: spill[0] := A;
L2: A := A + B;
// A = t0, B = b, spill[0] = a
L3: public_output(A);
L4: A := spill[0];
L5: A := A - B;
// B = b, A = t1, spill[0] = a
There is a simple correspondence between the source variables and the target
registers and spill array entries, inferred by the register allocation and spilling
method, and shown in the code comments. Note that this correspondence varies
depending on the program location. Therefore, it can be expressed by a mapping
σ : (Reg∪Spill)×Loc→ V from a register (or position in the spill array) and
a program location in the target to a corresponding variable in the source.
The two programs can thus be related by the following stuttering refine-
ment relation R (note that the stuttering can be avoided if we allow transitions
composed of blocks of instructions):
L = {(L1, L1), (L1, L2), (L2, L3), (L3, L4), (L3, L5), (End,End)}
(qS = qT ) ∧
k∧
i=1
L(`Si , `Ti ) ∧ ∧
v∈(Reg∪Spill)
(αSi (σ(v, `
T
i )) = α
T
i (v))

31
The refinement ensures that at every point of the program, every register and
position in the spill array contains the same value stored in the corresponding
variable of the source given by σ. The single-trace correspondence (L(`Si , `
T
i ) ∧∧
v∈(Reg∪Spill)(α
S
i (σ(v, `
T
i )) = α
T
i (v)) is a stuttering bisimulation, therefore this
refinement can also be used with properties with arbitrary quantifier alternation.
Note that we are making the assumption that the transformation preserves
observations. This might not be the case if the attack model includes, for ex-
ample, the address of memory positions accessed by the program, as the tar-
get program introduces a new array for spilling. In this case security might be
preserved or not, depending on the security property under verification, and a
specialized refinement relation would be necessary.
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